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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
The Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology LLC
("Monsanto") sells genetically modified seeds to soybean growers.
Monsanto's product features patented pesticide-tolerant genes that allow
soybean growers to make liberal use of the glyphosate-based pesticide
Roundup, another Monsanto product. Farmers who buy these seeds sign a
license agreement to use them for a single growing season, to keep the
seeds for themselves, and to not save any of the subsequent crop for
replanting, research, or seed production.
There is an exception to the prohibition on the resale of these seeds.
Monsanto has expressly authorized the sale of its seeds to grain elevators
as commodity seeds. Commodity seeds are an undifferentiated mixture of
pesticide-tolerant seeds and other varieties, and are commonly used as
feed. Monsanto conceded in its respondent brief that the license that
prohibits the resale of its pesticide-tolerant seeds does not provide for their
sale as commodity to grain elevators.
The defendant Bowman used Monsanto seeds for his first crop in
the years 1999-2007. Bowman also supplemented his first crop each year
with a "second-crop," or late-season planting. Because a second crop is
less likely to be lucrative, Bowman opted not to plant costly Monsanto
seeds for this phase, instead using cheaper commodity seeds purchased
from Huey Soil Service, a local grain elevator. Bowman used glyphosate-
based pesticide on his second crop plantings and conceded that these
soybeans were pesticide-tolerant. Although Bowman did not save the
seeds from his first crop, he gathered the progeny of the second-crop
plantings for reuse the following year.
Monsanto sued Bowman in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, alleging that Bowman's reuse of his second-
crop seeds was a violation of its patent rights as expressed -in its license to
Bowman. Bowman countered that he purchased the second-crop seeds
from Huey Soil Service and they were not subject to the agreement with
Monsanto that forbade second-generation use. Bowman also cautioned
that interpreting Monsanto's patent to allow it to retain control over self-
replicating products would undermine the exhaustion doctrine, which
holds that method patents are exhausted upon sale of the good embodying
the method.
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Monsanto insisted its rights to the genetic patent did not terminate
when those seeds reached the grain elevator and were added to the rest of
the undifferentiated commodity seed. The license agreement provided that
their seeds were not to be replanted for second-generation use, regardless
of their stint in a grain elevator. Monsanto cited the Plant Variety
Protection Act and argued that it must retain ownership over their seeds
for subsequent generations if inventors are ever permitted to control goods
that reproduce themselves.
Monsanto sought legal damages for Bowman's plantings dating
back to 1999, when Bowman had first replanted his commodity seeds.
Bowman claimed to receive notice of Monsanto's claim against him once
the action had commenced. Monsanto produced a letter it had sent to
Bowman in 1999 containing an allegation of patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit cited cases where replantings of seeds without
Monsanto's permission were held to be unauthorized, even when the
planter had never signed an agreement with Monsanto. The court
interpreted Bowman's license agreement to make no distinction between
the seeds that Bowman used in his first crop with those from his second
crop: both crops were subject to the prohibition on replanting. The fact
that Bowman had obtained his second-crop seeds from a grain elevator





United States v. King. 660 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011)
The Klamath River ("River") runs through part of the Californian
land the Karuk Tribe has considered home for many centuries. Gold
deposits are located in the River, as well as the Coho, or silver salmon, for
which the River is a designated critical habitat. Additionally, the River is
a source of cultural and religious significance to the Tribe. To remove the
gold deposits, miners will employ a machine called a suction dredger,
which vacuums a small area of the riverbed and extracts the gold from
other sediments. The Tribe contends that this mining significantly
disturbs surface resources and destroys the aquatic habitat. Particularly,
they allege that this mining activity kills salmonid and other fish eggs,
kills fish food sources and disturbs the fish and their reproductive
activities. However, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, individual states
issue permits for underground water injection, in order to prevent
contamination of underground sources of drinking water. In January of
1987, Cory King, the manager of Double C Farms Partnership, a large
farm containing both crop land and livestock, applied for a permit to inject
winter runoff from a creek that ran through the farm into 500 foot deep
wells on the property. The application stated that the water "must be
clean" because it was going to be pumped out of the well and used for
irrigation of the crop land in the summer. King's permit was denied.
In 2005, an inspector with the Idaho Department of Agriculture
was doing a routine inspection of Double C's farm when he noticed that
valves attached to the wells were installed backwards, causing animal
waste from Double C's livestock operation to flow backwards into these
deep wells. In February of 2008, the federal government filed criminal
charges against King, alleging four counts of willfully violating a state-
administered underground injection control program under the federal
Safe Drinking Water Act. He was convicted of all four counts.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, King made three arguments. First,
he claimed that the government was required to prove that his injections
implicated or pertained to an underground source of drinking water.
Second, he claimed Idaho's permitting requirement for injection wells is
not part of an applicable underground injection control program because it
had a greater scope of coverage than the Safe Water Drinking Act
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required. Third, he argued that if his conviction stood, Congress will have
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority under the Constitution.
In response to King's first argument, the court held the government
did not need to prove King's injections implicated or pertained to any
source of drinking water. Instead, the applicant for a permit has a burden
to prove that his activity will not have any adverse effects on drinking
water. Moreover, it does not matter if the defendant can prove that the
water being injected into wells is clean because that water can dissolve
contaminants while it passes through the well, and these contaminants can
then leach into sources of drinking water. The court then held that to
prove a criminal violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act the government
only needs to show a defendant willfully injected fluid more than eighteen
feet into the ground without a permit, and the defendant knew a permit
was required by law. The court also held the Idaho underground injection
program was valid because its provisions had been specifically
incorporated as applicable when the federal government approved Idaho's
program.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
injection portion of the Safe Drinking Water Act under the Commerce
Clause. The court first pointed to the considerations Congress provided
within the statute claiming that contaminated drinking water could have
deleterious effects on Medicare and Medicaid. Moreover, the court
believed water is a commodity often shipped across state lines. The
pollution of drinking water could have a drastic effect on the interstate
market, and therefore, even when the pollution is confined within one





1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 69 So. 3d 1123 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
The Fourth Circuit recently reversed a trial court decision that
would have permitted mining within the Everglades. The Palm Beach
County Commission issued a development order to Bergeron Sand and
Rock Mine Aggregates, Inc. ("Bergeron"), which granted them the right
to mine within the Everglades. The appellants, 1000 Friends of Florida
and Sierra Club, Inc., filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief claiming the development order was inconsistent with a Future Land
Use Element ("FLUE") policy. The FLUE policy stated that mining and
excavation shall only be permitted within the Everglade region to support
public roadway projects, agricultural activities, or water management
projects. Bergeron used some of the aggregate mined from the property to
support public roadway projects, and it was required to submit an annual
compliance report detailing which projects the mined material was headed
for. However, the President of Bergeron admitted he could not control
whether the material excavated from the Everglades mining site would be
used for the construction of public highways or for some other purpose.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Bergeron
concluding that the proposed mining was proper since at least a portion of
the material excavated from the site would be used to support public road
construction. In reviewing the trial court's decision under a de novo
standard of review, The Fourth Circuit used Florida Supreme Court
precedent to determine that the word "only" contained in Florida's FLUE
policy was a term of exclusivity and therefore was equivalent to the word
"solely." The Fourth Circuit concluded that the word "only" limited
mining in the Everglades to the three enumerated activities: public
roadway projects, agricultural activities, and water management projects.
Although Bergeron contended, and the trial court agreed, that the
FLUE policy only required the mining "support" road building, the Fourth
Circuit rejected this position which they believed elevated the word
"support" to the detriment of the word "only." The Fourth Circuit pointed
out that such an interpretation would allow mining projects to proceed
where only one percent of the aggregate is used for public roads or another
enumerated use. The statute would have no practical effect of limiting the
mining activities to those three uses. The Fourth Circuit supported its
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interpretation with a common canon of statutory construction: "to express
or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other." Following this
rule, it concluded the three uses listed were intended as an exclusive list
that excluded any use not listed. The Fourth Circuit also supported its
position with a rule of statutory interpretation that requires courts to avoid
rendering any part of a statute meaningless. The Fourth Circuit believed
the trial court's interpretation of allowing projects in "support" of building
highways rendered the term "only" superfluous.
The Fourth Circuit's limiting interpretation of the FLUE policy
will ensure that mining companies will not be able to participate in mining
projects within the Everglades Agricultural Area that are not exclusively
rooted in the three enumerated purposes of public road projects,




Patuxent Riverkeeper v. Md. Dept. of Env't, 422 Md. 294 (2011)
In this first impression case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a nonprofit environmental group, Patuxent Riverkeeper
("Patuxent"), had standing to initiate a judicial review of the Maryland
Department of Environment's ("MDE") decision to issue a "non-tidal
wetlands permit." One of Patuxent's members had standing because he
had alleged sufficient harm to his "aesthetic, recreational, and economic
interests in connection to the issuance of the non-tidal wetlands permit
issue."
MDE had issued a non-tidal wetlands permit to Petrie/ELG
Inglewood, LLC, otherwise known as Woodmore Towne Centre, LLC
("Woodmore"). Woodmore sought to construct a road expansion and
stream crossing to provide greater access to the Woodmore Towne Centre
development. After MDE issued the permit to Woodmore, Patuxent
initiated a judicial review of MDE's decision in the Circuit Court of
Maryland. However, the circuit court dismissed the case due to lack of
standing. Patuxent then petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a
writ of certiorari, which was granted without any prior proceeding in the
intermediate appellate court.
Chapters 650 and 651 of Maryland's laws enacted § 5-204(f) of the
Environment Article in 2009. Section 5-204(f) became effective on
January 1, 2010, and allows a judicial review of a final determination by
the MDE regarding any "issuance, denial, renewal, or revision of a
permit" as long as the person either: (1) meets the threshold requirements
under federal law; and (2) is the applicant, or "participated in a public
participation process through the submission of written or oral comments,
unless an opportunity for public participation was not provided." To meet
the federal threshold of standing, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a
concrete injury in fact that is traceable to the alleged actions of the
defendant. Furthermore, the injury must be redressable by a favorable
decision. Previously, only people whose personal or property rights were
adversely affected by MDE's decision had standing. Furthermore, a group
could only establish standing if it had a property interest of its own,
separate from its members. The new threshold enabled both individuals
and organizations to challenge MDE's permit decisions.
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A member of Patuxent, Mr. Linthicum, alleged that he had
suffered an injury in fact because the permit, which allowed the
construction of a road extension and river crossing, had endangered his
"aesthetic, recreational, and economic interests in the Patuxent River."
The court found that Mr. Linthicum had sufficiently asserted demonstrable
aesthetic, recreational, and economical interests because he is an avid
paddler who creates and sells maps of the river. According to scientific
and academic literature, the construction would cause nitrogen and other
pollutants to seep into the water downstream affecting the flow rate and
ecology of the river. The wetlands also absorb toxins created by
urbanized lands, and the eventual loss of the wetlands will lead to the
death and desertification of the tributaries, eventually affecting the main
river.
According to appellate court, Mr. Linthicum's reasonable concern
about the construction's future harmful effects on the river was
sufficiently alleged and closely connected to show the harm would be
caused by the construction. Furthermore, resending the permit was one
method of addressing the injury and preventing any further harm.
Therefore, the court determined Mr. Linthicum had the minimum standing
as required by federal law, and the judicial review should be allowed to
continue.
The dissent agreed with the majority's analysis of the more lenient
federal standing requirements. However, the dissent felt the majority's
interpretation of the threshold requirements of standing was too broad
because it would allow a plaintiff to claim that any environmental
degradation is harm to him.
The dissent believed there needed to be a stronger interest than a
plaintiffs generalized concern for the environment when challenging a
State's environmental permit. Also, the dissent did not consider
Linthicum's fears reasonable because he had not stopped and did not plan
to stop his recreational activities. He had also seen no visual change in the
river, an important reasonableness factor when claiming an aesthetic
interest. Mr. Linthicum did not demonstrate a concrete and particularized
injury in fact, and his alleged harms were not traceable to the issuance of
the permit. According to the dissent, the court should analyze a case from
the potential harm caused by the activities the permit allows, not the harm
caused by the urbanization of Woodmore.
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The dissent recognized the lack of a clear standard; but felt that at
some point, an injury can no longer be traced to the defendant's activities.
Linthicum needed to allege a more concrete and particularized injury. The
dissent found the harm Linthicum alleged to be based on urbanization, not
the completed construction. The dissent felt that Linthicum neglected to
explain how the generalized environmental harm would harm his own
interests. The dissent argued that the court should not accept Linthicum's
reasoning because it would allow any petitioner or organization that
appreciates nature to say that the "environmental degradation is per se
harm to them." The dissent argued that the case should be affirmed and
dismissed for lack of standing.
MARRIAM LIN
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Friends of Animals v. Caldwell, 434 F. App'x 72 (3d Cir. 2011)
The case concerns a call for review of a decision made by the
National Park Services concerning its decision and methods to reduce the
white-tailed deer population in a National Historic Park. Between the
years of 1983 and 2009, the white-tailed deer density in Valley Forge
National Historic Park, located northwest of Philadelphia, increased 31-35
deer per square mile to 241 deer per square mile. Due to appropriate
vegetation to meet a deer's voracious appetite, it is estimated the park can
only support 10-40 deer per square mile.
The National Park Services strived to protect, maintain, and restore
the native plant life while maintaining the white-tailed deer population.
The National Park Services created four alternative plans to meet these
goals following a three-year study, multiple public meetings, comments on
the issue, and the distribution of an environmental impact statement.
Plan A, dubbed "No-Action," called for a continuation of the
current efforts in maintaining and monitoring deer and vegetation life.
Plan B, dubbed "Combined Nonlethal Actions," included rotational
fencing of forested areas along with the introduction of chemical
reproductive control elements for the deer population once an effective
chemical agent became available. Plan C, dubbed "Combined Lethal
Actions," entailed a direct reduction in the white tailed deer population
through the use of sharpshooters. Plan D, dubbed "Combined Lethal and
Nonlethal Actions," involved the use of sharpshooters to reduce the deer
population, plus the use of a chemical reproductive agent once one became
obtainable. The National Park Service chose Plan D, finding that it would
take four years until the optimal deer population could be reached. Prior
to narrowing the options down to the aforementioned four, the National
Park Service considered the option of introducing wolves, cougars, or
coyotes to the park. However, such a plan was deemed unsuitable because
the park was relatively close to a densely populated urban area. Thus it
would not be appropriate to introduce large predators and there was
insufficient evidence to show that such predators would effectively reduce
and control the population.
The plaintiffs, two non-profit groups, Friends of Animals and
Compassion for Animals, filed a complaint challenging the finding that
the use of sharpshooters and chemical agents was the best solution for the
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deer population. The district court granted summary judgment for the
National Park Services and denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction as moot and further denied the plaintiffs' motion to supplement
the record with two additional studies. The plaintiffs' subsequently
appealed.
The Third Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court after
reviewing the summary judgment de novo and applying the proper
standards of review to agency decisions. The plaintiffs charged that the
National Park Services did not follow the National Environment Policy
Act ("NEPA") when it failed to consider increasing the coyote population
in its final assessment, claiming the National Park Service failed in
determining when an option is "reasonable." This alleged failure of
reasonability stemmed from the preference to "shoot the deer," and the
other options were nothing more than token policies presented in order to
appease the public.
Referencing Concerned Citizens Alliance, Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d
686 (3rd Cir. 1999), the court stated that although an agency ought to
review every reasonable alternative, there are limits to the thoroughness
with which an agency can analyze every option. Finding that not only did
the National Park Services adequately research and take note of possible
shortcomings in increasing the coyote population, the plaintiffs failed to
offer a detailed counterproposal that had a chance of success. The only
evidence offered by the plaintiffs were two studies, which the court found
to actually support the National Park Service's findings. Relying on the
empirical studies, the multiple meetings, and the options pursued prior to
narrowing the alternatives down to one, the court found the decision of the
National Park Service neither arbitrary, capricious, nor in error.
The plaintiffs argued the district court failed to conduct a probing
review of the record, substituting its own reasoning for the National Park
Services'. The Third Circuit found that even if the district court failed to
conduct a probing review and substituted its own reasoning, the error does
not require a remand in this case as the current court found the National
Park Service to be in compliance with the NEPA.
The Third Circuit finally addressed the district court's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record with additional studies, finding
that the studies ultimately either (a) did not conflict with the NPS's
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findings or (b) were irrelevant due to the focus of the subject matter being
on coyote-human interaction, not coyote-deer interaction.
The Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,





Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., et al. v Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011)
In September 2005, eight states, New York City, and three land
trusts brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against various large power corporations that own
and operate fossil-fuel-fired power plants in twenty states. The plaintiffs
sought to abate the corporations' ongoing contributions to the public
nuisance of global warming and to obtain a decree requiring an initial cap
on the defendants' carbon-dioxide emissions that would then be further
reduced annually. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal
common law action as a non-justiciable political question. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the
suit was not barred by the political question doctrine and that the plaintiffs
had Article III standing. Turning to the merits of the case, the Second
Circuit found the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the federal common
law of nuisance and the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common
law. The Second Circuit stated, "[u]ntil EPA completes the rulemaking
process, we cannot speculate as to whether the hypothetical regulation of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act would in fact 'spea[k] directly'
to the 'particular issue' raised here by Plaintiffs" as its reasoning for
declaring the federal common law of nuisance to not be supplanted. The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari at the request of the defendants to
hear the issue of whether the plaintiffs can maintain federal common law
public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters.
The defendants argued to the Supreme Court that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. The Court was equally divided
regarding this issue. Four members of the Court held that at least some of
the plaintiffs had Article III standing under Massachusetts v. EPA (a 2007
case where the Court held the Clean Air Act authorizes federal regulation
of emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases), while the
other four justices adhered to the dissenting opinion of Massachusetts and
argued none of the plaintiffs had standing. Under the rule from Nye v.
U.S., the equally divided Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision in
regard to standing and proceeded to the merits of the case.
The Court's examination of the merits began with a strong
statement from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins; "[t]here is no general federal
common law." However, the Court shortly thereafter mitigated this
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statement by explaining how a more keen understanding of federal
common law had developed.
The new federal common law addresses 'subjects within national
legislative power where Congress has so directed' or where the
basic scheme of the Constitution so demands. Environmental
protection is undoubtedly an area 'within national legislative
power,' one in which federal courts may fill in 'statutory
interstices,' and, if necessary, even 'fashion federal law.'
The Court went to maintain that Supreme Court decisions have allowed
federal commons suits brought by one state to abate the pollution
emissions from another state.
The Court next stated the legislative displacement of federal
common law does not require the same strict standards as preemption of
state laws. The test for whether congressional legislation displaces federal
common law is simply whether the statute "speak[s] directly to [the]
question" at issue. Using this lenient test, the Court held the Clean Air
Act in conjunction with the EPA's actions after Massachusetts had
displaced any federal common law right to seek an abatement of carbon-
dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants. In its reasoning, the
Court found the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to list categories of sources
that contribute to air pollution and endanger the health and welfare of the
public and to provide standards for the emissions of the substances. In
addition, the Act also provides for several enforcement mechanisms.
Further, the decision proclaimed the EPA, an expert agency, and not
district court judges, to be the best suited to serve as the primary source
for greenhouse regulation.
While this decision may have precluded the action of these
particular plaintiffs, it did not leave the EPA impervious from suit; "[i]f
EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of
pollution, States and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the
matter, and EPA's response will be reviewable in federal court." Also, the
Court left open the possibility that the plaintiffs might be able to bring suit
under state law. It did not decided on this issue because it was not briefed
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in the lower courts, but stated that the availability of a state law claim was
dependent on the preemptive affective of the Clean Air Act.
TREVER NEUROTH
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Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652
(7th Cir. 2011)
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") granted a permit allowing
Waste Management to destroy an area of wetlands bordering on
Horseshoe Lake State Park ("Park") in Illinois. Waste Management
indicated that it would be removing soil from the wetland area to cover
layers of waste in its adjacent landfill; this is known as daily cover. Thus,
approximately 61% of the wetlands area would be transformed into a dry
borrow pit. The permit was granted on the condition that Waste
Management mitigate the destruction by doubling the amount of wetlands
on a neighboring piece of land. Once the current landfill reached capacity,
Waste Management had plans to turn the borrow pit into a second landfill;
however, that project was tentative pending approval by the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency. Nevertheless, once they obtained the
permit from the Corps, Waste Management had the authority to begin
extracting their daily cover from the wetlands, and destruction of the
wetlands was inevitable regardless of whether the second landfill project
gained approval.
American Bottom Conservancy ("Conservancy") is an
environmental group dedicated to protecting a 175 square mile floodplain,
the American Bottom which include both the Park and the wetland area in
question. The Conservancy brought suit seeking to invalidate the permit
granted by the Corps. In support of its allegations, the Conservancy had
several members submit affidavits, two of which indicated that the
construction of the landfill would be detrimental to their ability to enjoy
watching various wildlife during visits to the Park. The third affidavit
indicated the destruction of the wetlands would reduce the amount of
wildlife observable in and around the Park. The defendants filed no
counter affidavits.
The district court held that, because the first two affidavits only
alleged harm caused by the creation of a landfill, and because the Corps'
permit served only to allow the daily cover extraction but not the
construction of a landfill, the first two affidavits did not prove any causal
connection between the injury and the offending conduct. Therefore,
neither of those affidavits satisfied the Article III standing requirements.
The district court recognized that the third affidavit did not suffer these
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problems because it referred to injuries caused by wetland destruction in
general rather than landfill construction; however the third affidavit failed
to establish Article III standing because it could not show any concrete
injury. Accordingly, the district court found it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case and dismissed without prejudice. The
Conservancy appealed the dismissal arguing the affidavits set forth facts
sufficient to establish standing.
On review, the Seventh Circuit indicated that to establish standing,
a plaintiff needs to allege the relief sought will, if granted, avert, mitigate
or compensate for an injury caused by or likely to be caused by the
defendant. The court also stated the injury alleged need not be a great
one; that in fact, the magnitude of the harm was not a crucial factor
underlying the requirements of standing. Accordingly, the court indicated
a mere reduction in or deprivation of the ability to observe wildlife is an
injury sufficient to confer standing. Finally, the court stated that a suit to
redress an injury to the plaintiff establishes Article III standing as long as
there is some non-negligible, non-theoretical, probability of harm, which
the plaintiffs suit would remedy if successful. Rejecting the lower courts
analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that although not a certainty, the
money and resources expended by Waste Management made it likely that
the landfill would be approved. As such, the first two affiants had alleged
a likely harm because the landfill was likely to go forward and this would
make their wildlife viewing experiences less enjoyable. Furthermore, the
court explained how the suit would provide remedy for that harm because
if the Corps' permit was voided neither the daily cover extraction nor a
future landfill could go forward and destroy the wetland area. Therefore,
success would prevent the diminution in their wildlife viewing. Based on
the foregoing, the court found the first two affidavits were sufficient to
establish Article III standing.
Agreeing with the third affiant, the Seventh Circuit stated that
since it was so close in proximity to the Park, the destruction of the
wetlands, regardless of the cause, would result in a reduction of
observable wildlife. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit also agreed with the
third affiant regarding the assertion that the mitigation area would not
adequately redress these harms because the benefits of that mitigation area
would take time to develop and would not be experienced in the near
future. In light of those facts, the court found that the third affidavit had
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alleged an injury, which a successful suit would remedy. Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit indicated its precedence had been wrongly applied by the
lower court and it was not necessary for a plaintiff to abandon and cease
using the area altogether to establish a concrete harm. Rather, the court
said the mere diminution in the pleasure derived from using the area was
enough to constitute injury for standing.
Since the affidavits showed the plaintiff would suffer harm
insomuch as the wetland destruction, regardless of its cause, would
diminish the amount of observable wildlife, the court found sufficient
injury in fact to establish standing. Additionally, because invalidation of
the Corps' permit would prevent the wetland destruction, the court was
satisfied that the suit, if successful, would remedy the harm alleged as is
required by the standing doctrine. Thus, the Seventh Circuit reversed the




Fla. Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d
1296 (11th Cir. 2011)
Five environmental groups filed suit in July 2008 against the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and its administrator, asserting
that Florida's narrative nutrient standard was inadequate under either the
1998 Clean Water Action Plan or the 1998 National Strategy Report. As a
result, the Clear Water Act ("CWA") required the EPA administrator to
promptly propose and publish new standards to be adopted within 90 days
of publication. Eventually, thirteen other parties intervened as defendants,
all denying the 1998 documents constituted a sufficient determination to
require action.
In 2009, during the course of that suit, the administrator issued an
unequivocal determination that the standard was inadequate. The EPA
formally determined the standard was inadequate, at which point new
standards were indisputably required. On December 30, 2009, the district
court issued a consent decree, moved for by the plaintiffs and the EPA,
that implemented a two-phase rulemaking process. Phase I required EPA
proposal of numeric nutrient standards for lakes and flowing waters by
January 14, 2010, with adoption by October 15 of the same year, unless
those requirements were superseded by the proposal of similar standards
by the state. Phase II required standards for coastal and estuarine waters
by January 14, 2011, to be adopted by October 15. Two of the intervening
parties, the Water Management District ("WMD") and the Utility Council
("UC"), appealed the order to the Eleventh Circuit.
In the process dictated by the decree, new standards were proposed
for public comment. The UC argued against adoption, claiming that the
existing rules were sufficient to meet CWA requirements. The standards
were passed notwithstanding those arguments.
The UC alleged three injuries from the decree in its appeal. It
claimed that conflicting compliance directives would cause damages.
Additionally, it asserted its interests would be damaged because of its
limited input into the rulemaking procedure, especially given the
timeframe under the decree. Finally, it claimed a procedural injury
stemming from the denial of its request for an evidentiary hearing before
the district court approved the decree. The WMD alleged two additional
injuries. First, it claimed violation of due process and administrative
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rights in the decree process, because the process lacked an administrative
record and sufficient discovery or fairness. Second, it claimed that the
decree's timeframe was unrealistic and damaged its interests by denying it
sufficient access to the decision-making process.
However, even without the consent decree, the Phase I rule could
not be vacated because it was supported by the 2009 determination, which
was independent of the decree. As a result, any injuries stemming from
the Phase I rule could not be addressed and the Eleventh Circuit found the
claims regarding the decree itself to be moot. Additionally, injuries
sustained in the rulemaking process could no longer be redressed once the
EPA had promulgated its rule, rendering moot the injuries sustained in the
rulemaking process. The WMD argued in response that the claims were
capable of repetition, yet evading review, but the Eleventh Circuit
observed that a direct challenge to either the determination or rule would
encompass review of all of the issues at hand, including the WMD's
claims. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Appellants' claims
regarding the Phase I rule. The Eleventh Circuit held the Appellants'
claims regarding the Phase II rule nonjusticiable for the same reasons, and
likewise dismissed them. The Eleventh Circuit made clear that it had not
closed the Appellants' avenue to challenge the 2009 determination, even
though the dismissal of their challenge to the consent decree was justified.
Judge Wilson, dissenting, challenged the dismissal claiming the
holding essentially prevented Appellants from asserting any means of
challenging the agency action. He argued that, even if the Appellants had
filed an independent suit against the determination (as they had), they
could not, under the courts ruling, challenge the determination as long as
the consent decree stands, which leaves them no means of redress.
Further, he stated precedent does not support the majority's holding of no
imminent procedural injury. Rather, case law indicates the consent
decree's influence on the rulemaking process may be sufficient to create
injury. Finally, he disagreed that there was no redressable injury, as a
favorable decision would have allowed the EPA and the district court to
evaluate whether or not the new standards were required. He claimed this
combination of factors effectively prevents any challenge to a consent




Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires
government agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for
any major federal action significantly affecting the human environment.
In preparing this statement, government agencies must "take a hard look"
at the effects of their actions, with the hope that they will consider all the
environmental impacts of their actions and that their decisions will not be
"arbitrary or capricious."
The Pinedale Anticline Project Area ("Project Area") covers
thousands of acres of land in Wyoming. The Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") manages about 80% of the Project Area. It is
believed that the land covers the third-largest natural gas field in the
United States. The Project Area is also part of the winter range of mule
deer and pronghorn, and provides year-round habitat for the greater sage-
grouse. It provides mating-display grounds, brood-raising areas, and
wintering areas for the grouse. Mule deer, pronghorn, and sage-grouse are
all game species of interest to local hunters.
In 2000, the BLM authorized an expansion of natural gas
development in the Project Area. Development increased faster than
expected. The BLM additionally made exceptions to seasonal restrictions
on development. Wildlife population declined, at least in part due to the
drilling and associated increase in human presence.
In 2005, oil and gas companies proposed a new development plan
to allow for additional wells and year-round drilling. For three years, the
BLM considered the proposed changes. They analyzed five alternatives,
and issued an environmental impact statement examining the various
proposals. In 2008, they issued a decision based on one of the proposed
alternatives which would allow for year-round development of natural gas
fields.
The Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership ("TRCP") filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. TRCP argued that the BLM's environmental impact statement
failed to take a "hard look" at the impact of increased drilling on hunting
in the Project Area. TRCP further argued that the decision, including
608
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
mitigation measures in the 2008 decision, was arbitrary and capricious.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BLM.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took up the appeal. The court
held the BLM's analysis of the alternatives for the development of the
Project Area sufficient. The court rejected TRCP's argument that the
BLM was required to consider alternatives that would reduce natural gas
drilling in the Project Area. The court held that the BLM had goals of
allowing for natural gas exploration and development, as well as
preserving the land for grazing and protecting wildlife. However, the
court held that the BLM never had the objective of preventing all declines
in wildlife population. The court held that the BLM examined a
reasonable range of alternatives in light of its goals.
The circuit court examined the record and found the BLM had
considered the impact increased drilling would have on hunting. The
BLM reasoned that hunting in the Project Area would decline because the
development would lead to a decrease in the amount of big game and
upland game birds. The court held this examination satisfied NEPA's
"hard look" requirement.
The circuit court rejected TRCP's argument that the mitigation
steps offered in the BLM's decision were arbitrary and capricious. The
BLM instituted policies intended to limit the impact that increased
development might have on wildlife. TRCP identified examples of the
insufficiency of those measures. The court rejected TRCP's argument
because it was unable to propose any alternatives that would allow for
increased development of the natural gas fields. The court held that the
BLM was only obligated to limit unnecessary or undue degradation, not
all degradation.
For these reasons, the circuit court affirmed the district court's




EPA Final Rulemaking: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel
Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles'
On August 9, 2011, the Obama Administration announced the
first-of-its-kind fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas pollution standards for
work trucks, buses, and other heavy-duty vehicles. The stated goal of this
new rule is to address the urgent and intertwined challenges of dependence
on oil, energy security, and global climate change and reducing fuel use is
a step in that direction. The new standards will save American businesses,
which operate and own the commercial vehicles, approximately $50
billion in fuel costs. The U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") and
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") developed the greenhouse
gas pollution standards. These government agencies also worked closely
with truck and engine manufacturers, fleet owners, the State of California,
and other environmental groups and stakeholders.
Semi-trucks, heavy-duty pickup trucks, vans, and vocational
vehicles such as transit and refuse trucks are the focus of the DOT-EPA
program. Specific standards are tailored for each category. EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson stated, "More efficient trucks on our highways
and less pollution from the buses in our neighborhoods will allow us to
breathe cleaner air and use less oil providing a wide range of benefits to
our health, our environment and our economy."
As a result of the application of the joint DOT-EPA program, the
heavy-duty trucks and bus industry will achieve record savings. Semi-
trucks are expected to reduce their fuel consumption by approximately
20% by model year 2018, saving an estimated four gallons of fuel for
every 100 miles traveled, with a corresponding reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions. Additionally, combination vehicles such as trucks and
buses built in 2014 through 2018 are expected to reduce oil consumption
by 530 million barrels and lessen greenhouse gas pollution by 270 million
metric tons. Vocational vehicles including delivery trucks, buses, and
garbage trucks are also required to reduce fuel consumption andgreenhouse gas emissions by an estimated 10% by model year 2018.
' 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, 1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1065, 1066, and 1068 (2011).
610
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
These vehicles could save an average of one gallon of fuel for every 100
miles traveled.
The standards from the joint DOT-EPA program will also provide
a wide range of benefits to the environment. These standards will reduce
emission of harmful air pollutants like particulate matter which can cause
asthma, heart attacks, and premature death. The benefits of the program
will also be reaped by consumers and businesses by reducing the cost for
transporting goods and spurring growth in the clean energy sector.
Additionally, the program will foster innovative technologies and will
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